GA GA reporting with Half-Baked Information

GA GA reporting with Half-Baked Information


China bought a 70 % completed ex-Soviet Cruiser which had turned into a rust bucket, from Ukraine in 1998. Finally China was able to commission this rusty old ship as an Aircraft Carrier in 2016 as LIAONING and everyone just went Ga Ga. Forgetting that this Ship is hardly capable of venturing out into the Open Seas, forget the Oceans. Now the launch of China’s second aircraft carrier, expected as soon as this week. The Ga Ga people have already termed this as an important and depressing moment for India. HOW??????

As per these GA GAs ”the Type 001A Aircraft Carrier  SHANDONG  will give China an edge for the first time in the carrier race with its Asian rival, a literal two-to-one advantage. After decommissioning the INS VIRAT earlier this year, the Indian Navy is down to a single carrier, INS VIKRAMADITYA. Worse, the SHANDONG has been built at China’s own giant shipyard at Dalian; VIKRAMADITYA is merely a repurposed 1980s-era Russian carrier. For its part, the Indian Navy has gone all-in on a strategy that emphasizes carrier battle groups. The idea is that India must dominate the ocean that bears its name and needs carriers in order to project power well beyond its shores. As a result, it wasted far too much time and treasure on the Admiral Gorshkov, which arrived from Russia six years late and at three times the cost that had initially been promised.”

The GA GAs have failed to mention or rather are simply unaware of the prowess of VIKRAMADITYA. In the last few years this formidable Ship, in spite of escalation cost wise still one fifth of a brand new Carrier, has been fine-tuned into a potent fighting force. Indian Navy has the experience of operating Aircraft Carriers since 1959 not only as sailing ships but as part of a fighting Navy. The Aircraft has been used in actual battle by the Indian Navy. Also the fact that a brand new indigenous Aircraft Carrier will be getting commissioned by 2018 into the IN. In contrast SHANDONG will be joining the Chinese Navy only by 2025 and it should take a year or two of practice drills before she dares to sail outside the comfort of its own shore line. In fact by 2025, INS VISHAL, the second indigenous Indian Carrier and this time Nuclear Powered, should be getting commissioned into the Indian Navy.

GA GAs go on to add that even more telling than the raw numbers…. though .presently with just one shore hugging Carrier…. is what China’s progress says about India’s ability to provide security in its own backyard. Chinese naval strategists have open designs on the Indian Ocean: According to one, “China needs two carrier strike groups in the West Pacific Ocean and two in the Indian Ocean.”   This is very ticklish indeed for the IN which is already planning for four Carrier battle Groups and may already be working out the frame work for six.

Probably GA GAs are aware of all this, so cleverly they argue that efforts to develop a home grown carrier have been even more misbegotten.” The Indian Navy plans to commission the INS VIKRANT next year. At that point, the ship reportedly won’t have its aviation complex in place, or even anti-aircraft missiles. The Navy has puzzlingly refused to buy India’s indigenous light fighter, the Tejas, saying it’s too heavy. Meanwhile, the MiG-29s being used instead are enormously troubled. To support their argument they have quoted CAG, India’s government auditors whose report had stated that more than 60 per cent of MIG29s engines were withdrawn from service or rejected in just four years. The Vikrant will only be properly combat-ready by 2023 — eight years behind schedule. Well they will get a shock soon when VIKRANT will go for sea trials and then gets commissioned by end of next year. The naval MIGs two and half  times more formidable than present IAF MIG 29 will then be flying from its deck with  TEJAS MK2s Naval variant joining soon thereafter.”

The GA GAs then go to help China in its psy warfare by parroting that No one would expect India to match China’s defense spending head-to-head. China’s economy is four times the size of India’s; not surprisingly, its defense budget is at least three times larger.[ they forget to add that it has much bigger border to guard too]. But the People’s Republic faces a parallel dilemma when confronting the US, whose military budget is about three times as big as China’s. China has approached this disparity with a much clearer strategy in mind, as well as a far more rational evaluation of its relative strength. Rather than focusing on matching America’s carrier fleet, China first emphasized asymmetric weaponry such as ballistic missiles and submarines, a reflection of the Soviets’ successful Cold War strategy.

Only now — as its interests and capabilities have grown — is it pouring resources into developing carrier groups. By contrast, India’s carrier-first strategy has drained the Navy of resources and left it with just 13 conventional submarines in service. Eleven of those are more than a quarter-century old. The two new ones, amazingly, were commissioned and sent out to wander the deep sea without their main armament, torpedoes. Nor has India tried to counter China’s numerical superiority — 70 to 15 — in terms of submarines with specialized anti-submarine weaponry, including helicopters. The Indian fleet has less than 30 superannuated medium-sized anti-sub helicopters, the first of which was bought in 1971. India’s problem isn’t ultimately a shortage of money; it’s a lack of forethought and political courage. Carriers are big and showy, and bolster national pride; diesel submarines don’t, or at least not to the same degree.

A more rational strategy for India — and its peers in Asia and the Pacific Rim who fear China’s growing military might — would ensure that India’s submarine fleet and its anti-submarine armaments are capable enough on their own to deter attempts to control the Indian Ocean, while closer ties with other navies fill in the gaps. That would require a clear-eyed appraisal of India’s defense and economic capabilities and requirements — a problem when India doesn’t have an outline of its strategy on the lines of American or Chinese white papers, nor even a full-time defense minister. The Navy is fortunately starting to train more closely with the U.S. and other partners such as Japan, which should increase its effectiveness. But until it thinks harder about where its money should go, it’s going to have a tricky time keeping China out of its backyard.

The Chinese are unnerved by the fact that Indian Navy has vast experience, a very balanced force and what is most important Well Led. Yes like all Naval Forces it has problems, mostly created by own lethargic Government of the past with one of the most incompetent Defence Minister who remained at helm for a whole decade. By 2030 when Chinese Aircraft Carrier will dare to make its first Operational entry into Indian Ocean, Indian Navy will have more than adequate number of conventional, nuclear powered attack and nuclear powered ballistic missile armed submarines. It need not try and match numbers with 70 Chinese submarines, a majority of which are meant for coastal waters only. We already have a full squadron [12 aircrafts] of P8Is and planning for at least one more if not two. All other assets are also being planned to grow in numbers and lethality as per requirement. IN will be ready for anyone to try and dominate Indian Ocean; after all it’s for nothing that it has been named so, not by India but by rest of the world.